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ABSTRACT 
 
While Canada is often described as the most and France as one of the least successful 
countries in the realm of immigrant incorporation, the question remains unresolved of 
how to evaluate a country’s policies for dealing with immigration and incorporation 
relative to that of others.  Our strategy is to examine the relationships among 1) countries’ 
policies and practices with regard to admitting immigrants, 2) their educational policies 
for incorporating first and second generation immigrants, and 3) educational achievement 
of immigrants and their children.  We compare eight western industrialized countries. We 
find that immigration regimes, educational regimes, and schooling outcomes are linked 
distinctively in each country.  States that are liberal, or effective, on one dimension may 
be relatively conservative, or ineffective, on another, and countries vary in their 
willingness and ability to help disadvantaged people achieve upward mobility through 
immigration and schooling.  We conclude that by some normative standards, France has a 
better immigration regime than does Canada. Overall, this study points to new ways to 
study immigration and new normative standards for judging states’ policies of 
incorporation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There would probably be no consensus even on the descriptive question of which 
countries exhibit more favorable environments for second-generational 
educational success. Clearly, it is highly desirable to move toward more 
standardized analyses with larger samples in order to establish the cross-national 
patterns (Heath et al. 2008): 227).   2 
 
That is our goal in this article.
1  But we begin with a concrete example:  Observers often 
depict Canada as the model for immigration policy and immigrant incorporation, at least 
in comparison with other wealthy industrialized countries.  For several decades, federal 
and provincial governments have sought immigrants and welcomed them with an official 
policy of multiculturalism and institutions designed to help incorporate newcomers 
(Bloemraad 2006).  An unusually high proportion of the public endorses increased or 
stable levels of immigration.
2  Immigrants and their children are generally well educated 
and get good jobs, and relatively few live in isolated ghettos.  Although Canada is not 
innocent of racism, it has a constitutional commitment to multiculturalism and many 
strong policies designed to foster mutual respect and minority empowerment. 
In contrast, France is often seen as a model of how not to handle immigration and 
immigrants.  For decades, immigrants were reluctantly admitted and encouraged to return 
home after completing their needed but ill-paid work.  Naturalization laws are 
complicated; most immigrants’ children born in France become citizens only at specified 
ages, with specified lengths of residency, and at parental request.  France rejects official 
recognition of ethnicities or races in favor of shared republicanism; no matter how 
desirable as an ideology, the lack of systematic data makes it difficult to address painfully 
clear group-based disadvantage.  A large share of immigrants and their descendents live 
in isolated, deeply poor communities with high crime rates, few jobs, and poor schooling.  
Descendents of immigrants rioted in 2005 to protest their exclusion from full membership 
in French society, but little has changed.  Two-thirds of the French, compared with fewer 
than one-third of Canadians, would prefer less immigration. 
  We do not dispute these characterizations of Canada and France; too much 
evidence supports both.  We do, however, want to complicate the picture of each society 
in two ways, by responding to the call in the epigraph above.  We systematically compare 
eight western,
3 industrialized states in terms of their immigration and citizenship regimes, 
educational regimes, and schooling outcomes for immigrants and their descendents.
4  
Locating Canada and France among other states permits a comparison that may affect 
one’s evaluation of their (and other countries’) strategies for dealing with immigration 
and incorporation.  The comparison will at least provide an essential discipline for any 
discussion of feasible reforms.  
In addition, we bring together the often separated topics of immigration policy 
and immigrant policy.
5  There are several compelling reasons to do so.  First, 
immigration and immigrant (non)incorporation are seamlessly linked in the lives of those 
individuals who move from one country to another or whose parents did so; artificially 
separating the two phenomena distorts any understanding of newcomers’ actual 
circumstances.  Second, in policy terms, a country’s immigration policy will necessarily 
affect, though it will not determine, its incorporation policy.  For example, a receiving 
country that encourages immigration of former colonial subjects faces a different, though 
not necessarily easier, set of issues with regard to assimilating them than does a country 
that encourages or permits immigration of people with no historical, linguistic, cultural, 
or community ties.
6  Third, the politics of immigration and immigrant incorporation may 
be linked.  If the native-born perceive immigrants to be of “high quality,” however that is 
defined, they are more likely to welcome them into schools, neighborhoods, workplaces,   3 
and political organizations than if the country permits entry from people who are feared 
or despised. 
Finally, one’s normative position with regard to immigration is complicated by 
considering immigration and immigrant policy together.  People on the left may be 
especially anxious for immigrants to be incorporated into receiving countries fully, 
respectfully, and without any hint of racism or second class citizenship.  But that is most 
likely to occur when immigration policy has restricted entry to newcomers of the same 
ethnic background who bring with them considerable social, cultural, and financial 
capital.  Such a restrictive immigration policy may seem unfair to those on the left (it 
certainly seems unfair to us).  Conversely, people on the right may be especially anxious 
for immigrants to contribute economically, generally by taking low-paid or unpleasant 
jobs with few takers among the native born.  But that is most likely to occur when 
immigration policy encourages deeply poor and often non-Anglo newcomers, who bring 
few resources to the host country except their ability and willingness to work hard for 
slight reward.  That sort of immigration policy makes assimilation very difficult to 
accomplish – which may be of especial concern to those on the right.  
Only by looking at both sides of the dynamic – who is permitted to enter and what 
happens after they enter – can a polity decide what combination of virtues and defects, or 
benefits and costs, to embrace. As our analysis below shows, the costs and benefits are 
not fixed; a state can do a good deal to enhance or undermine incorporation from any 
starting point in immigration policy. But who enters surely affects who becomes a full-
fledged member of the receiving polity. And yet, immigration and immigrant regimes are 
too seldom considered together in academic (or political) discourse. This article brings 
them into direct contact, so that we can evaluate how well countries are handling 
migration issues broadly defined.   
Given space constraints, we address only what is happening across our eight 
polities, saying little about why and how immigration and schooling regimes are linked. 
Answering those questions is, of course, essential, but temporally secondary.  Only after 
we have achieved some clarity on what these countries are doing, which turns out to be 
surprisingly difficult,
7 can we eventually pursue answers to why and how.   
We conclude after this analysis that Canada does not look so good in its handling 
of migration, nor France so bad, as initial impressions suggest.  More abstractly, 
immigration regimes and regimes for immigrants turn out to be linked in quite distinct 
ways.  Countries that are liberal, or effective, on one dimension are relatively 
conservative, or ineffective, on the other.  Demonstrating the varied relationships 
between immigration and immigrant regimes will, we hope, challenge common beliefs 
about policy bundles or political strategies and encourage deeper and clearer thinking 
about a phenomenon likely to shape the twenty-first century.  
 
Defining Terms and Choosing Cases 
An immigrant is narrowly incorporated in a host society if he or she can act effectively: 
supporting a family, being able to engage with the public arena, staying healthy enough 
to engage in daily activities, speaking the host country language well enough to 
communicate, acquiring enough contextual knowledge to negotiate daily exigencies.
8  A 
more expansive definition of incorporation would include a sense that one’s religious, 
cultural, and possibly nationality-based values and practices can be expressed in the host   4 
country without penalty or denigration, and that one can make some demands on the 
polity without fearing retribution or total failure. Most broadly understood, an immigrant 
or immigrant’s child is incorporated when the fact of being foreign-born or -parented 
plays no explanatory role in one’s life choices and trajectory.
9  Thus immigrants could 
remain, or even become, poor or powerless and still be fully incorporated if a native-born 
person in the same circumstances might well have the same outcome.   
Although immigrant incorporation has many facets, we focus only on schooling, 
especially school achievement as measured through test scores.  Education is both a key 
indicator and a cause of other types of incorporation. As one author put it, France’s 
assimilation policy is based on “the unifying function assigned to state institutions, and 
particularly the school, in the building and the reproduction of… citizenship” (Zanten 
1997 ). Mutatis mutandis, one could say the same about most if not all western 
industrialized states.  
Within the realm of education, we focus on scores on standardized achievement 
tests.  Test scores are only one – and a highly controversial -- element of schooling.  But 
they are potentially comparable across groups, time, and countries, and they are 
reasonably good predictors of success later in life  (for example, see  (Hedges and Nowell 
1999).  Roughly speaking, the higher one’s test score, the better are one’s chances for a 
good job, fluency in the host country’s language, good health, effective social and 
political participation, and cultural engagement.  Test scores, especially measured as 
relative change over time, are also a good indicator of how hard a host country is trying 
to incorporate newcomers.  If a country educates all of its students fairly well or if it is 
improving in its capacity to educate those at the bottom of the test score distribution, it 
stands a good chance of succeeding in other incorporative efforts as well.  
“Successful” incorporation requires a normative, not empirical, definition.  
Immigrants are better off, narrowly speaking, if they believe that their lives are improved 
compared with what would have happened had they stayed in the country of origin.
10  
The receiving society is better off, narrowly speaking, if its members believe that they 
gain more from immigration than they lose, and if enough members of the society 
perceive a positive balance so that immigration and immigrant policies are relatively 
persistent and stable.
11  Defined broadly, success requires that enough immigrants and 
host-country residents are genuinely glad that the migration has occurred; it is a positive 
good, not just the lesser of various evils.  For example, many Russian Jewish migrants to 
New York city, and most of their children, are thriving, while Dominican migrants and 
their children have found much less success (Kasinitz et al. 2008). 
   Why these eight states?  Our goal was to examine enough wealthy industrialized 
countries to see a wide array of immigration and education regimes, while keeping the 
comparisons manageable.
12  The main distinction is between Anglophone, chiefly settler-
based, states (United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and Australia) and continental 
European countries in which large-scale immigration is new.  Within the latter group, 
France and Germany were obvious choices.  Belgium and Switzerland provided 
representation from smaller states with recent intense politics around immigration. This 
set of states includes unitary and federal, large and small, Anglophone and non-
Anglophone, welcoming and ambivalent, educationally rigid and fluid – and ultimately 
more and less successful – polities that are all wrestling with migration and its impact.  
   5 
Immigration Regimes 
The eight countries vary in how many, and what kind of, migrants they admit?
13 All have 
experienced immigration over the past decade, although at varied levels, as figure 1a and 
1b show.  We provide two versions of figure 1; the second panel excludes the United 
States so that variation among the other cases is easier to see.  
 
Figure 1a. Inflows of Foreign Population into Selected OECD Countries, 1996-2006 
(including the United States) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Inflows of Foreign Population into Selected OECD Countries, 1996-2006 
(excluding the United States) 
   6 
 
 
 
Figure 1a shows that the number of migrants per year skyrocketed in the United States 
after 1996, increasing the gap between it and the rest of our eight states.  As Figure 1b 
shows more clearly, migrant flows have declined slightly in Germany, and increased 
slightly in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, thus diminishing the disparities 
among four of the seven states.  By 2006, we see three clusters in terms of the absolute 
number of migrants: few (Switzerland, France, and Belgium), some (Germany, UK, 
Canada, and Australia), and many (US).  (Migration has declined with the recent 
economic downturn, but these basic patterns have not changed.)
14   
As a proportion of the state’s population, the pattern is different.  As of 2005 (the 
most recent years with comparable OECD data), almost a quarter of the population in 
Australia and Switzerland were foreign-born.  They were followed by Canada (19 
percent), Germany and the US (13 percent each), the UK (10 percent), Belgium (9 
percent), and finally France (8 percent)  The foreign-born share of the state’s total 
population has remained about the same since 1995 in Australia and Belgium, has grown 
somewhat in Canada and France (becoming about two percent more of the population), 
and has grown substantially in Germany, Switzerland, the US and the UK (becoming 4 to 
6 percent more of the population).
15  In short, each of these countries shows a different 
combination of absolute numbers, population proportions, and change over time in 
numbers and proportions.  The politics and policies around migration and incorporation 
can likewise be expected to differ. 
 
Migrants’ Legal Status:  Of course, not all migrants have the same political status or 
evoke the same response from the host country, so one must quickly move beyond raw   7 
numbers. The most crucial political distinction among migrants is between legal and 
illegal entry.  In the aggregate, the share of immigrants who are undocumented affects 
labor markets, the political valence of immigration, law enforcement, educational 
opportunities, electoral representation, and other mechanisms of incorporation.  For an 
individual, legal status dramatically affects one’s capacity to become incorporated, with 
impacts lasting across generations (Bean et al. 2006). 
  So far as we can tell from very inaccurate estimates, countries vary greatly in their 
number and proportion of undocumented immigrants. As of 2008, the United States had 
up to 12 million undocumented migrants, almost 4 percent of the total population and 
about 30 percent of the foreign-born (Passel and Cohn 2008).  According to one estimate, 
perhaps a quarter of the foreign-born in the UK are “irregular migrants.” Comparable 
figures for our other states are 17 percent in Belgium, 14 percent in Germany, 10 percent 
in Switzerland, 6 percent in France, 3 percent in Canada, and 1 percent in Australia 
[(Mansoor and Quillan 2006); (Papademetriou 2005); authors’ calculations from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/828518448448; (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2006a): 46). 
 Flows of illegal migrants probably vary across years more than do flows of legal 
migrants, depending on the condition of a receiving country’s economy and labor market, 
the rise and fall of punitive or regulatory regimes, and the situation in the home country 
(Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009).  Most illegal migrants are young adults, 
disproportionately male and childless (at least in the host country). They are less likely 
than legal immigrants to be in school in the host country.  All of this points to the fact 
that the process of incorporation of the undocumented is probably very different than that 
of legal immigrants. Both for that reason and because we simply do not have the evidence 
needed to analyze them carefully, the rest of this article focuses on legal immigrants or on 
“immigrants” in general.  
 
Status of Legal Migrants: Legal immigrants themselves have particular statuses, which 
imply different receptions in a host country and different capacities for successful 
incorporation.  Figure 2 shows the variation across our eight states in immigration 
statuses for legal permanent migrants, again for the most recent year available, 2006.   
 
Figure 2:  Migration Inflows by Legal Status in Selected Countries, 2006  
   8 
 
Source: authors’ revision of (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2008b), p. 38 
 
Roughly speaking, we can separate immigrant slots into two categories: those intended 
mainly to benefit the native-borns and host country through admission of generic workers 
(the first two bars – work and free movement), and those intended primarily to benefit 
immigrants through admission of particular individuals (the third and fourth bars – family 
and humanitarian).  Both groups can become incorporated, but we assume here that 
immigrants who bring desired high-skilled labor into a country have the greatest chance 
for full incorporation. 
Clearly these eight states are setting different policies for the kinds of immigrants 
they seek or permit.  Almost three-quarters of legal immigrants into Switzerland and 
Germany in 2006 came to work,
16 whereas over three-quarters of legal immigrants into 
Canada and especially into the United States came to join their families or as asylees or 
refugees.
17   
If one looks at the amount of effort states make to attract the immigrants they 
want, the pattern looks a bit different.  Australia, Canada, and the UK gave the most 
incentives to attract permanent skilled workers in the early 2000s, whereas the US gave 
the fewest (Lowell 2005).  Germany had no program at all for permanent skilled worker 
immigration; Switzerland, France, and Belgium were in the middle of this index.  
Programs to attract temporary high-skilled workers as of 2004 were similarly ranked; 
among our states the UK and Australia were the most encouraging, and Germany the 
least. (Belgium and Switzerland were not ranked in this analysis)
18 [(Lowell 2005; see 
also (Cerna 2008)). 
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Immigrants’ Educational and Occupational Level:  Whatever their legal status, once 
immigrants have entered a host country, incorporation can, in theory, begin.  How 
successful it will be partly depends on the newcomers’ educational level. Figure 3 
compares levels of education of foreign-born and native-born adults in 2003-04, at two 
levels of education. The first panel focuses on tertiary or college-level education, and the 
second on less than secondary schooling.  Both figures are arrayed so that as one moves 
down the panel, one moves from immigrant advantage to immigrant disadvantage relative 
to native-borns.  
 
Figure 3a: Tertiary Education of Foreign- and Native-Born Populations, Aged 25 to 
54, in Selected Countries, 2003-2004 
 
 
Figure 3b: Primary Education of Foreign- and Native-Born Populations, Aged 25 to 
54, in Selected Countries, 2003-2004 
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Immigrants show a bimodal distribution of educational levels in many countries, 
corresponding to the several tracks of the country’s immigration regime.  A higher 
proportion of immigrants than of native-borns in Canada, Australia, and the UK have 
tertiary degrees (college or higher)—to be expected in countries that actively seek or 
disproportionately permit to enter high-skilled workers.  Conversely, in the United States, 
Switzerland, France, and Germany, a much higher proportion of immigrants than of 
native-borns have only a primary level of education – also to be expected in countries 
that have not recruited high-skilled workers, that have a long history of low-skilled guest 
workers programs, or that have a high share of immigrants entering illegally, through 
family reunification or via humanitarian programs.  
A similar array emerges, not surprisingly, if one looks at the occupations of 
native- and foreign-borns.  More immigrant than native-born men are professionals in 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, and the UK; the reverse obtains for Switzerland and 
Germany (data are not available for the US) [(Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 2008d): table 6.1].  That accords with the evidence on educational 
levels in figure 3 for all countries except France. 
  One can already begin to see complications in the portrayals of France and 
Canada with which this chapter started.  For decades, Canada has sought and attained 
permanent immigrants with high levels of education and job skills.  By now, even its 
extensive family reunification policies yield a relatively high-status immigrant population. 
Thus as of 2001 it ranked the second highest (after Australia) of our eight states in an 
index of immigrant education, whether measured relatively or absolutely (Lowell 2005).  
That is a comparatively easy population to approve of, and to incorporate into one’s 
society.     11 
France, conversely, has admitted primarily immigrants with low levels of 
education and qualifications only as low-wage laborers.  It has recently sought to appeal 
to high-skilled workers, but as of 2001 it ranked the lowest of our eight states in the index 
of immigrant education (Lowell 2005).  That is a comparatively easy population to 
disapprove of, and a hard group to incorporate into one’s society.  The full story of the 
connections among immigration regimes, immigrants, and incorporative policy is much 
more complicated, of course, but a good starting point is to note that a country’s 
immigration regime may be closely connected with its subsequent ease in incorporating 
its immigrant population. 
 
Contextual Knowledge:  Immigrants also vary in their knowledge of the environment into 
which they are moving.  Knowing the host country’s language facilitates incorporation, 
no matter how broadly defined, since it greatly facilitates one’s capacity to succeed in all 
other domains of life (Euwals 2007; Hansen 2008).  Broader knowledge of the society is 
also associated with immigrants’ ability to foster their children’s schooling (Heath et al. 
2008) and presumably to achieve other goals as well.   
A state’s choice of immigration regimes can considerably affect the proportion of 
newcomers who bring these forms of social capital with them.  English language ability 
(and French, in Canada) is part of the point system for high-skilled workers in Canada, 
the UK, and Australia.  Some countries encourage residents of former colonies or 
descendents of host-country nationals to “come home;” those people have backgrounds 
that make them relatively familiar with their new homes, even if their relationship with 
the “home” country is psychologically complex.  Conversely, some countries welcome or 
permit people from very different backgrounds to immigrate.   
Table 1 shows the variation in the likelihood of contextual knowledge among 
immigrants for our eight countries.  It includes two measures: the share of the foreign-
born population in each state from the countries of origin sending the largest number of 
immigrants (the stock), and the average annual immigration from 1995 to 2005 from the 
five most significant sending countries (the flow).
19  These two measures overlap 
substantially but not completely.  
 
Table 1: Countries of Birth of Foreign-Born Population in Selected Countries, 1995 
to 2006  
Country  Countries of birth of  largest 
number of immigrants 
% of foreign-born 
population 
% of total inflow, 
annual average for 
1995-2005 
Australia  
UK   
New Zealand  
Italy  
China  
Vietnam  
India 
South Africa 
   (2005)  23.6% 
9.4 
4.6 
4.0 
3.7 
2.9 
2.4 
     12.5% 
     13 
      -- 
       8.0 
      -- 
      5.5 
      5.0 
Belgium  
France  
Morocco  
Italy  
Netherlands  
Turkey  
Germany 
 (2005)    12.3 
11.7 
 9.9 
 8.8 
 6.6 
 6.6 
    13 
    10 
      4.0 
    12 
4.5 
5.0   12 
Canada  
UK  
China  
Italy  
India 
US 
Philippines 
Pakistan 
(2001)     11.1 
 6.1 
 5.8 
 5.8 
 4.4 
 4.2 
-- 
    2.5 
  13.5 
   -- 
  11.0 
3.0 
6.0 
5.0 
France  
Algeria  
Morocco  
Portugal  
Italy  
Spain  
Turkey 
Tunisia 
Cameroon 
(2005)      13.7 
12.6 
11.5 
 6.9 
 5.7 
4.6 
4.5 
-- 
17.5 
16.0 
-- 
-- 
-- 
7.0 
6.0 
2.5 
Germany* 
 
Turkey 
Italy 
Poland 
Greece 
Serbia & Montenegro 
Russian Federation 
Romania 
(2005)     26.1 
  8.0 
   4.8 
   4.6 
   4.4 
   2.8  
-- 
8.0 
5.0 
13.0 
-- 
-- 
5.0 
3.0 
Switzerland* 
Italy 
Serbia & Montenegro 
Portugal 
Germany 
Turkey 
France 
(2005)      19.6 
13.0 
11.0 
10.4 
5.0 
4.6 
7.0 
8.0 
9.0 
               15.0 
3.0 
  7.5 
United Kingdom 
India  
Ireland 
Pakistan  
Germany  
Poland  
Australia 
France 
United States 
New Zealand 
(2006)      10.0 
    7.2 
    4.8 
    4.7 
 4.0 
   2.0 
   1.0 
   2.9 
-- 
4.5 
-- 
3.0 
4.0 
-- 
9.5 
7.5 
7.5 
5.5 
United States  
Mexico  
Philippines  
India  
China  
El Salvador  
Vietnam 
(2005)      30.4 
    4.5 
   4.0 
    3.8 
3.1 
2.9 
19 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
2.0 
4.0 
Sources: column 3:(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007a): Tables 
B.1.4, B.1.5.  Column 4:(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2008c), pp. 
42-43 
* Stocks of foreign population, not foreign-born, in column 3. 
 
Judging solely by country of birth, some host countries will have a much easier 
time incorporating their immigrants than will others.  Column 3 shows that fully a third 
of Australia’s and Switzerland’s foreign-born populations, and close to a quarter of those 
in Belgium and the UK, are native speakers of the host country’s language.  In contrast, 
none of the largest groups of foreign-born populations in France, Germany, or the US are.  
Column 4 shows the same advantage for recent migrants to Australia, Belgium,   13 
Switzerland, and the UK, and the same linguistic disadvantage for recent migrants to 
France, Germany, and the US. Only Canada shows a shift from a linguistically somewhat 
advantaged stock to a linguistically somewhat disadvantaged flow (as migration has 
shifted from the UK to China).   
 
Citizenship Regimes: Individuals choose whether to become citizens of the receiving 
country, but only within a set of constraining or motivating rules [(Bauböck 2006); 
(Minkenberg 2003); (Klusmeyer and Aleinikoff 2002); (Koopmans et al. 2005)].  
Citizens are in a better position to become both narrowly and broadly incorporated 
(Howard 2006); for example, some states restrict public service employment to its 
citizens.  So citizenship rules are a crucial link between immigration and integration 
regimes.  Those rules vary across our eight cases, as does the proportion of foreign-born 
citizens. One citizenship policy index for the 1980s includes four of our eight cases. 
Belgium, France, and the UK had liberal rules; Germany was restrictive, as it had been 
since World War II on the grounds that it was “not an immigration country.”
20  However, 
Germany recently liberalized its citizenship laws, earning a “moderate” ranking by 2000 
(Howard 2006).  From another study, we can add the United States and Canada as liberal, 
and Australia as moderate (by these criteria, the UK is moderately restrictive) (Hansen 
2008).
 21  Switzerland remains consistently the most restrictive; it has no birthright 
citizenship, generally requires twelve years of residency and accomplishment of other 
benchmarks, and includes a decision by local authorities about a person’s suitability to be 
a citizen of that locality. Voters defeated referenda to liberalize this regime several times 
in the past few decades, most recently in 2004 [(Helbling 2008); (D'Amato 2009)]. 
The British Council’s Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) has developed a 
6-item index of “access to nationality” for legal immigrants and their families.  By this 
measure, Belgium and Canada have the most welcoming rules for access to nationality, 
averaging 2.5 each; France and the UK are close behind at 2.3 and 2.2 respectively; and 
Germany and Switzerland are least welcoming, at 2 and 1.7 respectively. 
[http://www.integrationindex.eu/ ]  Our own calculations (using the 4 indicators 
identified) place the US at 2.75 and Australia at 3 – making them the most accessible 
[(Weil 2001); http://www.citizenship.gov.au/applying/spouses.htm]. 
As a result of these laws and their own situation or preferences, immigrants vary 
across countries in their likelihood of naturalizing.  As of roughly 2000, only one tenth of 
foreign born residents of Switzerland were Swiss citizens, in sharp contrast to the three-
quarters of immigrants into Canada who had become citizens. In between lay Germany 
(29 percent), Belgium (41 percent), the US (48 percent), France (53 percent), and 
Australia (68 percent).
22  
 
Arraying Countries by Conditions for Successful Incorporation 
We have now identified many of the key elements of immigration and membership 
regimes – legal status at entry, citizenship laws, education, knowledge of the host 
language, and cultural capital. Some of these indicators are themselves results of multi-
item indices, and others could certainly be added.  But the basic elements are in place for 
a robust index of the conditions for successful incorporation. The index enables us to 
array states along a continuum of, in effect, how difficult a task they have set for 
themselves in seeking to turn newcomers into “us.”    14 
  Appendix Table A1 scores the eight states on the twelve components of the index.  
Countries are awarded scores of 3 (high), 2 (medium), or 1 (low) points. High scores 
imply favorable conditions for successful incorporation of adult immigrants; low scores 
imply relatively or absolutely unfavorable conditions. Given the absence of any 
compelling causal theory of incorporation indicating that some criteria should matter 
more than others, we treat each element as independent and equal.  
  The results in Appendix Table A1 are summarized in table 2, which arrays the 
countries from the most to the least favorable conditions for successful incorporation: 
 
Table 2: Scale of Conditions for Successful Incorporation in Selected Countries, c. 
2005 
 
  Score on index of 
conditions for 
successful 
incorporation  
Number of 3’s 
(favorable 
conditions for 
incorporation) 
Number of  1’s 
(unfavorable 
conditions for 
incorporation) 
Number of items 
for which the 
country could 
not be scored  
Australia  34  10  0  0 
UK  30  7  1  1 
Canada  29  7  2  0 
Belgium  27  4  1  2 
France  24  3  3  0 
Switzerland  22  3  5  2 
US  19  2  7  1 
Germany  16  1  9  0 
 
NOTE: We examined 12 elements on a scale of 1 to 3, so possible scores range from 12 to 36. A 
country with missing data for an element was scored at 2, in order to neither advantage nor 
disadvantage states on that element. 
Source: Appendix Table A1. 
 
Australia, Canada, and the UK have established immigration regimes and immigrant 
flows that make it relatively easy for newcomers to be at least narrowly incorporated into 
their societies.  Conversely, Switzerland, Germany and the US have – intentionally or not 
– done the opposite.  France and Belgium present a mixed picture, for quite different 
reasons.   
We turn next to the same exercise of building an index, now focusing on 
schooling regimes.  The goal is similar: to array countries along a continuum of the 
degree to which they foster young newcomers’ ability to become incorporated.  We focus 
on education both because comparable data are available and because schooling is the 
main vehicle for children’s successful assimilation.  
 
Educational Regimes 
Once a state recognizes that immigrants and their children are not going “home” soon, it 
must decide how and how much schooling to provide.  Schools and systems vary in their 
ability and willingness to educate all students, but this article sets practice aside in order 
to focus on policies to promote educational achievement.  We assume that, as with 
immigration regimes, a democratic polity’s laws and rules for schools roughly reflect its   15 
citizens’ goals and commitments.  We turn, then, to an examination of those laws and 
rules.  
 
School Expenditures: A necessary, though hardly sufficient, element of any schooling 
regime is funding.  The relationship is much looser than anyone would prefer (Burtless 
1996), but roughly speaking the more a state spends on schooling, the higher the level of 
student achievement – or at least that is what one hopes.  Our eight states vary in their 
levels and trajectories of spending on schools, as table 3 shows:  
 
Table 3: School Spending for Selected Countries, c. 2005 
 
  Annual expenditure per 
student for all services, 2005 
Annual expenditure per student 
for all services, relative to GDP 
per capita, 2005 
 
Pre-
primary 
 
Primary    Second
ary  
Change in 
expenditure on 
schools, 1995-
2005 (primary 
through post-
secondary, non-
tertiary) 
(2000 = 100) 
Pre-
primary 
 
Primary    Seconda
ry  
Australia  --  $6000  8400  74   to 113  --  18  25 
Belgium  4800  6600  7700  xx   to 107  15  21  24 
Canada  --  --  7800 
(2004) 
106 to 116     
(2004) 
--  --  24  
(2004) 
France  4800  5400  8900  90   to 101  16  18  30 
Germany  5500  5000  7600  94   to 99  18  16  25 
Switzerland  3900*  8500*  12,900*  101 to 110* #  11  24  36 
UK  6400  6400  7200  87   to 140  20  20  23 
US  8300  9200  10,400  80   to 108  20  22  25 
*public institutions only 
# public expenditures only 
Source:   (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2008a), chapter B. 
 
The countries vary.  The US spends about twice as much per capita as Switzerland on 
pre-primary, but less on secondary, schooling.  Australia and the UK substantially 
increased their expenditures on schooling from 1995 to 2005, but they ended up 
differently, since the UK now proportionally outspends all other countries by a wide 
margin, whereas Australia sits in the middle of the pack.  
Of course, national expenditures encompass immigrant, second generation, and 
native children alike, so they only begin to inform us of the schooling regime for 
incorporating newcomers.  We turn, thus, to more fine-grained indicators of policies for 
educational incorporation. 
 
Selection Criteria: Some schools and systems offer many second chances for students 
who initially struggle, while others use stringent rules to direct students into distinct 
channels. Some schools and systems have strong supply-side selection criteria, while 
others rely more on parental demand or less explicit selection criteria such as geographic 
districting.  Table 4 presents various decision rules by which students select, or are 
selected into, their location in a country’s schooling regime. The table focuses only on   16 
elements that most experts see as sorting mechanisms, making educational outcomes less 
equal or random than if that element did not obtain.
23  
 
Table 4:  Principals’ Report of Selection Criteria for Schools or School Systems in 
Selected Countries, c. 2006 
 
% of students in schools where the following is 
prerequisite or high priority for admission to the 
school 
 
 
First age 
of 
selection 
in school 
system 
Student’s 
academic 
record 
Recommen-
dation of 
feeder 
school 
Parents 
endorse 
religious or 
instructional 
philosophy 
of school 
Other 
family 
members 
attend the 
school 
% of students 
in school with 
ability 
grouping in all 
subjects 
Australia  16  9  18  27  42  5 
Belgium  12  26  7  40  10  22 
Canada  16  10  22  15  26  15 
France  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Germany  10  39  38  11  17  11 
Switzerland  12  51  40  2  2  40 
UK  16  10  7  12  33  8 
US  16  8  9  5  10  7 
 
Sources: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007b); (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2007c) 
 
Again, countries vary.  Switzerland has the most stringent formal policies – early age of 
selection, high proportion of schools with ability grouping, and high proportion of 
placements that depend on past achievement.  Australia may have the most stringent 
informal policies, in the sense that many schools select according to parents’ views or the 
siblings’ attendance.  German school tracks select participants very early, which 
disadvantages newcomers [although Table 4 does not reflect Germany’s unique system of 
apprenticeship that works well for many immigrants, or at least their children (Crul and 
Schneider 2005)]. 
  Like funding policies, selection criteria seldom focus directly on immigrant or 
minority status.  However, the final element in our educational regime index does, since 
the students who need language training are likely to be disproportionately immigrants or 
their children. 
 
Language Policy: All of these eight countries (or regions within them in some cases), 
have policies to foster acquisition of the host-country language.  Table 5 shows the range 
of policies and the rough proportions of immigrant students in each type of program:  
 
Table 5: Language Policy for Immigrant Students in Primary and Lower Secondary 
Education, Selected Countries, 2003 
 
  Immersion in  Immersion, with  Immersion after  Transitional   17 
language of 
instruction 
systematic language 
support in language 
of instruction 
preparatory phase 
in language of 
instruction 
bilingual 
education, or 
maintenance 
bilingual education  
  Primary  Lower 
secondary  Primary  Lower 
secondary  Primary  Lower 
secondary  Primary  Lower 
secondary 
Australia*  5-19%  0->80%  35-
80% 
0-80%  0-64%  0->80%  0-10%  0 
Belgium 
(French 
community 
only) 
>80  >80  0  0  <5  <5  0  <5 
Canada*  --  0  35-80  65-80  --  0-64  0  0 
France  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Germany  5-19  >80  50-80  5-19  <5  <5  <5  0 
Switzerland*  0-34  <5-80  20->80  20-80  <5  <5  0  0 
UK  0  0  >80  >80  0  0  0  0 
* varies by region of the country 
Source: ((Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2006b): chap. 5.) No 
comparable data are available for the US. 
 
Table 5 is hard to interpret, since policies vary not only by country but also by region, 
district, school grade level, and recency of immigration.  Arguably, in fact, language 
policies vary at least as much within a state as across them.  Nevertheless, language 
policies can be added to the index of educational regimes by taking the midpoint in each 
range, separately for primary and for lower secondary grade levels – recognizing that this 
indicator is more than usually noisy. 
 
Arraying Countries by Schooling Accessibility for Young Newcomers 
 We can now construct an index of educational accessibility for newcomers.  Appendix 
Table A2 locates the eight countries on a seventeen-item index, ranging as before from 3 
(most accessible) to 1 (least accessible).  Table 6 shows the results; it is analogous to 
table 2, the index of immigration regimes.  The table ranges from the countries with the 
most to those with the least accessible schooling regimes for newcomers: 
 
Table 6: Scale of Educational Accessibility for Newcomers in Selected Countries, c. 
2005 
 
  Score on index of 
schooling 
accessibility for 
newcomers  
Number of 3’s 
(high level of 
accessibility) 
Number of  1’s 
(low level of 
accessibility) 
Number of 
items not 
scored  
US  44  11  1  3 
UK  39  8  3  0 
Canada  35  4  3  4 
Australia  35  5  4  3 
Switzerland  33  6  7  0 
France  31  2  5  8 
Belgium  28  2  8  1   18 
Germany  26  1  9  0 
 
NOTE: We examined 17 elements on a scale of 1 to 3, so possible scores range from 17 to 51. A 
country with missing data for a given element was scored at 2.  
Source: Appendix Table A2 
 
As before, this analysis would benefit from refinement, but it is highly suggestive.  
The United States received the highest score – reinforcing the old image of American 
exceptionalism, in which schooling rather than social welfare policy is the preferred 
vehicle for providing and equalizing opportunity (Hochschild and Scovronick 2003).  The 
US is followed by the other Anglophone countries.  The least accessible schooling 
regimes are in Belgium, Germany, and possibly France (for which we lack good data). 
Few features of schooling in these countries ease newcomers’ path.  Rather surprisingly 
given recent electoral hostility to immigrants, Switzerland ranks in the middle.  
We turn finally to the third component of the mapping project -- newcomers’ 
schooling achievement.  With it, we can analyze the relationship between “inputs” 
(immigration regimes), intermediaries (the schooling regime), and “outputs” 
(immigrants’ test scores) – and thus evaluate countries’ overall response to immigration.  
 
School Achievement 
One can measure and compare achievement levels in several ways.  To do so, we use data 
from the 2000, 2003, and 2006 PISA initiatives.  [For an explanation of PISA, see 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007b); on its impact, see 
(Grek 2009)].  The analyses in the next few paragraphs explicate figures 4a, 4b, and 4c, 
which show comparable results for the three PISA years:  
 
Figure 4a: Combined Reading, Math, and Science Performance in PISA 2000,  
by Country and Immigration Status  
   19 
 
 
Figure 4b: Combined Reading, Math, and Science Performance in PISA 2003, 
by Country and Immigration Status  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4c: Combined Reading, Math, and Science Performance in PISA 2006, 
by Country and Immigration Status 
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PISA is designed so that the average score on each test is 500 points, and two-thirds of 
the test takers score between 400 and 600 points.  The panels of figure 4 sum test scores 
for reading, math, and science for each test year, so that the average score for each year is 
1500 points (the dark horizontal line in each figure).  Separate scores for each test, by 
country, year of test, and immigration status are in Appendix A3.   
 
Levels of Achievement: Except in the US, native-born children (the solid light bar) always 
score at least 1500 points in each year. (Native-born Americans scored 970 on math and 
science in 2006; reading scores are unavailable.)  Native-born Canadians always score 
the highest; native students in Switzerland, Belgium, and Australia consistently do well. 
Those in the US and France usually, though not always, score the lowest.  
  Immigrants (the solid dark bar) in Australia and Canada also always score above 
1500 points -- but only once (in the UK in 2006) do immigrants in any other country 
come close to that level.  Conversely, Belgian immigrants never score above 1300, and 
those in Switzerland, Germany, and France never pass 1350. (Immigrants in the US in 
2006 scored a respectable 884 on two of the three tests).   
  Second generation students (the striped bar) do somewhat better than foreign-born 
students, as one would hope if assimilation is occurring. The children of immigrants in 
Australia and Canada always score above 1550; they scored above 1500 in the UK in 
2000 but not in any other country or year.  Conversely, second generation students scored 
below 1350 in Belgium and Germany in each test year.  (Second generation students in 
the US in 2006 scored 914 on two of the three tests.) 
  The data suggest a slight improvement over time in second generation 
achievement, given that there are no scores below 1300 in 2006, unlike in 2000 or 2003.  
 
Disparity: Test Scores of Native- and Foreign-Borns:  The absolute levels of achievement 
show, to no one’s surprise, that native born students score the highest in most cases.  A 
more subtle analysis is needed to show progress, or lack thereof, in newcomers’   21 
achievement levels. (Appendix table A4 shows the results of these comparisons, derived 
from Appendix table A3).   
Consider first immigrant compared with native-born students.  Twenty-two 
comparisons can be made between immigrants and native-borns, given three test years 
and data for eight countries in each year (with the exception of the UK in 2003 and the 
US in 2006).  In only six of the 22 comparisons, all in Australia and Canada, is the 
disparity between native borns and immigrants slight, that is less than 50 points.  
Conversely, in seven comparisons, the disparity is great – more than 200 points -- and it 
occasionally reaches 300 points in Switzerland, Germany, and Belgium.   
Disparities between native borns and immigrants diminished slightly over the test 
period in a few countries.  Australia, France, and the UK were the most effective, and 
Canada, Switzerland, and Germany made some progress in reducing the achievement gap 
between native borns and immigrants.  Belgium and the US were ineffective; in two of 
the three subjects in both countries, disparities increased over the six year period. 
 
Mobility: Test Scores across Immigrant Generations:  We cannot literally compare across 
generations since we lack data linking immigrant parents with their children; we do not 
even have data to compare young immigrants who arrived a generation ago with young 
immigrants arriving recently.  We can, however, compare immigrant children to the 
native-born children of immigrants – that is, compare immigrants (the dark bar in each 
panel of figure 4) and second generation immigrants (the striped bar) at a given point in 
time.
24  Greater incorporation in this case is a larger distance between the groups, on the 
grounds that a child born in a host country should be able to achieve more in school than 
a child born outside the host country.  If the second generation student has test scores as 
low as or lower than the immigrant student, that is a clear signal that the host country is 
not effectively incorporating even children born on its soil. 
  As above, 22 comparisons are available between immigrant and second-
generation students, given three test years and data for eight countries in each year (with 
the exception of the UK in 2003 and the US in 2006). Only three of the 22 comparisons 
show a disparity of 100 points or more between second generation students and 
immigrants—one each in the UK, France, and Switzerland. However, in three 
comparisons, second generation students score worse than immigrants in that country – a 
clear signal that mobility is stalled.  This dismal result occurs once in Belgium and twice 
in Germany.  In most of the other comparisons, second-generation students score roughly 
50 points higher than do their immigrant counterparts; that is a sign of some assimilation, 
but not of highly successful incorporation.  
Judging by these test scores, the second generation made slightly greater gains 
compared with immigrants in 2000 than in subsequent years, while more scores indicate 
very little assimilation in 2006 than in either of the previous test years.  In five of the 
eight countries – Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the UK – second generation 
students lost ground compared with immigrant students between 2000 and 2006. The US 
showed a slight improvement across immigrant generations and, surprisingly, Belgium 
showed a dramatic improvement. 
 
Educational Assimilation: Test Scores of Natives and the Second Generation:  Perhaps 
the most important measure of incorporation is how well native-born children of   22 
immigrants do compared with native-born children of host country nationals (Simon 
2003).  This measure enables us to consider how much of an achievement gap remains 
when one “controls for” immigration status, by comparing two sets of children born in 
the host country.   
  Once again, 22 comparisons are available between native-born and second-
generation students, given three test years and data for eight countries in each year (with 
the exception of the UK in 2003 and the US in 2006).  The comparisons reveal some 
grounds for optimism.  In seven of the 22 comparisons, disparities are relatively small 
(100 or fewer points) and in two more, second-generation test takers do better than their 
native born peers. By this measure, second-generation students in Australia and Canada 
are completely assimilated, those in the UK are doing quite well, and those in the US are 
assimilating to some degree.   
However, the comparisons between native-born and second-generation students 
also provide grounds for dismay.  On seven of the 22 comparisons (all three in Belgium 
and Germany and one in Switzerland), disparities between natives and the second 
generation exceeded 200 points, sometimes by a lot.  That is as bad as the discrepancy 
between natives’ and immigrants’ scores in those countries.  Educational assimilation has 
not taken place in those states. 
  The assimilation scores suggest both increasing and decreasing assimilation, 
depending on the country.  Over the six year period, Belgium reduced the disparities 
between native born and second generation the most (it had the longest way to go), while 
France, the UK, and the US showed some improvement or improvement in some but not 
all three fields.  Disparities in Switzerland and Germany grew.  
 
Arraying Countries by Students’ Educational Outcomes 
As we did with immigration regimes (table 2) and educational regimes (table 6), we can 
now rank the countries through an index of educational incorporation.  The components 
of the index and scoring on each component are in Appendix Table A5; Table 7 provides 
the results.   
 
Table 7: Scale of Newcomers’ Academic Achievement in Selected Countries, 2000 - 
2006 
  Score on index of 
academic 
achievement for 
newcomers  
Number of 3’s 
(high level of 
achievement or 
increases in 
achievement) 
Number of  1’s 
(low level of 
achievement or no 
increases in 
achievement) 
Number of 
items for 
which the 
country could 
not be scored 
Australia  18  5  2  0 
Canada  17  4  3  0 
UK  17  2  1  0 
France  16  2  2  0 
US  15  0  1  0 
Belgium  13  2  5  0 
Switzerland  12  1  5  0 
Germany  10  0  6  0 
 
NOTE: We examined 8 elements on a scale of 1 to 3, so possible scores range from 8 to 24.     23 
A country with missing data for a given element was scored at 2. 
Source: Appendix Table A5. 
 
  The three countries most effective in educational incorporation, as judged by test 
scores, are Anglophone, although none is a stunning success.  Belgium has improved 
considerably from a very unequal starting point, while Switzerland and Germany are 
failing, at least relative to the other states in this group, to incorporate newcomers 
educationally. 
 
Comparing Immigration Regimes and Educational Regimes 
We can now bring the strands of the analysis together in order to jointly consider 
immigration and educational regimes.  Having three summary indices permits three sets 
of comparisons, which provide the basis for our normative conclusions. 
 
Immigration Regimes and Educational Regimes: Combining tables 2 and 6 gives 
leverage on the question of whether states seek to bring in immigrants with a lot of 
incorporative resources, to encourage successful incorporation through schooling, or both. 
Figure 5 shows the eight states’ relative positions:  
 
Figure 5: Comparing Immigration Regimes and Educational Regimes 
 
 
 
 
Australia, the UK, Belgium, and Canada seek – in different ways -- to admit immigrants 
with the capacity to be rapidly incorporated; among those four, the UK stands out for its 
provision of educational policies to facilitate newcomers’ incorporation and Belgium for 
its relative failure. Conversely, the US and Germany permit (or seek) immigrants for 
whom incorporation will be difficult, and the two countries differ dramatically in their 
schooling policies to facilitate it.  France and Switzerland lie in the middle on both 
dimensions.   24 
  The various locations in figure 5 have very different normative qualities. In our 
view, two countries have attractive policies, albeit quite different from one another. The 
US accepts people who are deeply disadvantaged and has promulgated schooling policies 
that encourage their incorporation, at least in theory; the UK also has incorporative 
educational policies, although it makes its assimilative task easier by seeking immigrants 
with more social and cultural capital relevant to the host country.  Three other countries 
have less morally compelling policies; Canada, Belgium, and Australia aim to attract high 
status immigrants and do relatively little to aid young newcomers in school. Germany is 
the most problematic. It accepts deeply disadvantaged immigrants, but has few policies to 
encourage their academic success or incorporation.  The normative status of France and 
Switzerland is more ambiguous in this set of comparisons. 
 
Educational Regimes and Academic Achievement:  Combining tables 6 and 7 gives 
leverage on how much states do to enable newcomers’ school achievement, and how 
successfully they do it.  Figure 6 shows the results:  
 
Figure 6: Comparing Educational Regimes and Newcomers’ Academic Achievement 
 
 
 
 
 
As in the earlier comparison, states differ in their relative success on one or both 
dimensions. The schooling policies of Canada, Australia, and France do relatively little to 
assimilate newcomers, but their newcomer students nevertheless have considerable 
success.  The UK and especially the US have more accessible schooling regimes, with 
high test score results in the UK and a little lower in the US.  Switzerland is roughly as 
accessible than France, but much less successful in schooling outcomes; Belgium, and 
Germany have neither accessible schooling regimes nor successful newcomer students.   25 
As before, these results have distinct normative connotations.  Germany, 
Switzerland, and Belgium lend themselves to an accusation of exploiting vulnerable 
immigrant children.  Their policies are not designed to promote newcomers’ educational 
success, and they do not do so.  The US and the UK, in contrast, are the most morally 
attractive; their schooling regimes promote assimilation to a considerable degree, and 
they are reasonably successful.  Australia, Canada, and France, finally, are normatively 
ambiguous. Their newcomer students can almost be said to succeed at higher levels than 
their educational policies deserve.  That is surely a good thing for these countries and 
their populations, but it is not especially morally praiseworthy.  
 
Immigration Regimes and Educational Policy:  Finally, combining tables 2 and 7 
provides the broadest framework for analyzing levels of immigrant incorporation. Figure 
7 brings the beginning and end of the process we have been mapping into direct 
comparison, by relating immigration regimes to schooling outcomes:  
 
Figure 7: Comparing Immigration Regimes and Newcomers’ Academic 
Achievement 
 
 
 
  
Australia, the UK, and Canada demonstrate the most successful incorporation.  Their 
immigration regimes are designed to bring in immigrants with many resources 
appropriate to the receiving country, and their young newcomers do in fact achieve at a 
high level.  Switzerland and especially Germany can be said to have gotten what they 
asked for. They have immigration regimes that encourage migrants with few resources 
appropriate to the receiving country, and their newcomer students are struggling in school.  
Belgium is in perhaps the most unfortunate position; its immigration regime is designed 
to admit migrants with fairly high levels of relevant resources, but newcomer students are   26 
not achieving at a commensurate level.  France and the US are the most interesting and 
surprising of the eight cases. Both have immigration regimes that permit or encourage 
immigrants with few resources useful in the host country, but both are producing 
newcomer students with relatively high levels of achievement.  From this vantage point, 
France and the US can be said to be the most effective, in terms of “value added,” of the 
eight countries. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, this mapping exercise provides grounds for a several normative as well as 
empirical judgments about the consequences of migration to wealthy industrialized 
western states.  Low-skilled migration to OECD countries can be thought of as 
exploitation of people whose only alternative is to remain in deep poverty in their native 
country, or as the voluntary choice of people eager to improve their lives.  For us, the 
crucial question is the consequence of this type of migration, especially for the young.  In 
some cases, such as Switzerland and Germany, the receiving country seems to be 
indifferent to or perhaps discriminatory against young migrants, at least in the sense that 
their academic achievement is low.  In other cases, such as France and the US, the 
receiving country is quite effective, even impressively so, in incorporating the children of 
low-skilled newcomers through schooling.  
  In parallel fashion, high-skilled migration to OECD states can be thought of as 
encouraging a brain drain from countries that badly need the resources that migrants take 
with them, or as a legitimate opportunity for people with resources to use them to help 
themselves, their families, and perhaps society at large.  Again, for us the crucial question 
is what happens after migration, especially to the young.  The UK, Canada, and Australia 
show success in educational incorporation, mainly by promulgating policies to encourage 
those migrants most likely to succeed.  Empirically, it is a smart policy; normatively, it 
does not deserve great praise.  Finally, Belgium has apparently the worst of both worlds – 
policies to promote immigrants with high levels of resources, but relative failure to 
achieve incorporation through schooling.   
To return to the opening examples: we conclude that France may have a better 
immigration regime than Canada, at least for the migrants and perhaps for the world as a 
whole.  That is not what one would infer from media reports of recent events, but it does 
seem to be what is revealed by combining immigration policies and immigrant policies.  
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Appendix Table A1: Elements of Scale of Conditions for Successful Incorporation,  
c. 2005 
 
Element 
Highly 
favorable 
conditions: 
3 points 
Moderately 
favorable 
conditions: 
2 points 
Unfavorable 
conditions: 
1 point 
% foreign borns who are 
undocumented 
France 
Canada  
Australia 
Belgium  
Germany 
Switzerland 
US 
UK 
 
% of immigration slots for work 
Switzerland 
Germany 
 
UK 
Belgium  
Australia 
France 
Canada  
US 
Policy re temporary high-skilled 
workers 
UK 
Australia 
France 
US 
Canada 
Germany 
Policy re permanent high-skilled 
workers 
Australia 
Canada 
UK 
France 
 
US 
Germany 
Ratio of tertiary education for native-
born vs. foreign-born 
Australia  
Canada 
UK 
Switzerland 
France 
US 
Belgium 
Germany 
Ratio of primary education for native-
born vs. foreign-born 
Australia 
Canada 
Belgium 
UK 
US 
Switzerland 
France 
Germany 
Ratio of professional jobs for native-
born vs. foreign-born men 
Australia 
Belgium 
Canada  
France 
UK 
  Switzerland 
Germany 
Stock of foreign-born with contextual 
knowledge of host country  
Australia 
Switzerland 
Belgium  
UK 
Canada 
 
France 
Germany 
US 
1995-2005 flow of foreign-born with 
contextual knowledge of host country  
Australia 
Belgium  
Switzerland 
UK 
 
France 
Germany 
US 
Canada 
Legal ease of citizenship acquisition 
Belgium 
France 
UK 
US 
Canada 
Germany 
Australia  Switzerland 
Proportion of foreign born (or  Canada  Belgium  Switzerland   32 
foreign) who are citizens of host 
country 
Australia 
 
US 
France 
Germany 
Access to nationality  Australia 
US 
Belgium 
Canada 
France 
UK 
Germany 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A2: Elements of Index of Schooling Regimes that Make Education 
More or Less Accessible to Newcomers, c. 2005 
 
Element 
High (level of 
accessibility to 
immigrants): 
3 points 
Medium: 
2 points 
Low: 
1 point 
Annual spending per 
student 
                --pre-primary 
US                
UK 
Germany     
 
France           
Belgium       
Switzerland   
                --primary  US                 
Switzerland   
Belgium        
UK                
 
Australia       
France             
Germany          
                --secondary  Switzerland    
US                     
France            
Australia        
Belgium       
Canada     
Germany          
UK                   
Change in schooling 
expenditure 1995-2005 
 
--highest 
absolute level 
UK 
Canada 
Australia 
Switzerland 
Belgium 
France 
Germany  
US 
       
       --largest increase  
UK 
Australia  US 
Canada 
France 
Germany 
Switzerland 
Annual spending per 
student relative to GDP 
                --pre-primary 
US 
UK 
Germany 
France 
Belgium 
Switzerland 
                --primary  Switzerland 
US 
Belgium  
UK 
Australia 
France 
Germany 
                --secondary  Switzerland 
France 
Australia 
Germany 
US 
Belgium 
Canada 
UK   33 
First age of selection  
Australia                 
Canada            
UK                  
US                   
Belgium         
Switzerland     Germany        
Needed for admittance 
to the school  
 
        --academic record 
Canada            
UK                   
Australia           
US                     
Belgium         Switzerland    
Germany        
       --recommendation 
of feeder school 
US                     
Belgium            
UK                    
Canada          
Australia       
Switzerland     
Germany         
       -- parents endorse 
school philosophy  
US                     
Switzerland       
Canada          
UK                
Germany       
Belgium          
Australia         
       -- family members 
attend the school 
Belgium            
US                     
Switzerland       
Canada          
Germany       
 
Australia          
UK                   
% of students in school 
with ability grouping in 
all subjects 
Australia 
UK 
US 
Belgium 
Canada 
Germany 
Switzerland 
Breadth of anti-
discrimination law  
Canada 
France 
Germany 
UK 
  Belgium 
Switzerland 
Stringency of language 
policy (focus on 
immersion) 
         -- primary 
Australia 
Canada 
Germany 
Switzerland 
UK 
Belgium 
       
          --lower secondary  Canada 
UK  
Switzerland 
Australia 
Belgium 
Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A3: PISA Test Scores, by Country, Subject, Year, and Immigration 
Status 
 
Panel 
A3.a  2000 
  Reading  Math  Science 
  1. 
Native 
born 
2. 
Immi-
grants 
3 
2
nd gen. 
4. 
Native 
born 
5. 
Immi-
grants 
6 
2
nd gen. 
7. 
Native 
born 
8 
Immi-
grants 
9 
2
nd gen.   34 
Australia  532  513  528  536  526  535  531  514  523 
Belgium  522  431  411  536  432  418  511  419  401 
Canada  538  511  539  536  522  530  535  503  521 
France  512  434  471  523  441  487  510  408  451 
Germany  507  419  432  510  423  437  507  410  423 
Switzer-
land  514  402  460  548  443  489  514  407  454 
UK  528  456  510  534  483  505  537  457  519 
US  511  466  478  500  451  467  506  473  462 
 
Panel 
A3.b  2003 
  Reading  Math  Science 
 
10 
Native 
11 
Immi-
grants 
12 
2
nd gen. 
13 
Native 
born 
14 
Immi-
grants 
15 
2
nd gen. 
16 
Native 
born 
17 
Immi-
grants 
18 
2
nd gen. 
Australia  529  517  525  527  525  522  529  515  520 
Belgium  523  407  439  546  437  454  524  416  435 
Canada  534  515  543  537  530  543  527  501  519 
France  505  426  458  520  472  448  521  433  465 
Germany  517  431  429  525  454  432  529  444  412 
Switzer-
land  515  422  462  543  453  484  531  429  462 
UK  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
US  503  453  481  490  453  468  499  462  466 
 
Panel 
A3.c  2006 
  Reading  Math  Science 
 
19 
Native 
born 
20 
Immi-
grants 
21 
2
nd gen. 
22 
Native 
born 
23 
Immi-
grants 
24 
2
nd gen. 
25 
Native 
born 
26 
Immi-
grants 
27 
2
nd gen. 
Australia  514  514  521  510  530  531  529  527  528 
Belgium  515  413  434  535  423  451  523  430  443 
Canada  532  512  532  531  524  524  541  519  528 
France  495  449  459  504  442  458  505  438  456 
Germany  510  440  427  519  454  441  532  455  439   35 
Switzer-
land  515  430  467  547  459  485  531  436  462 
UK  499  455  492  499  474  474  519  479  493 
US  --  --  --  481  444  458  499  442  456 
Sources: Panel A3.a: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2001): 
table 6.10 
Panel A3.b: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2006b), tables 
2.1a, 2.1b, and 2.1c 
panel A3.c: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007c), tables 
4.2a, 4.2d, 4.2e 
   36 
Appendix Table A4: Comparisons of PISA scores, 2000, 2003, and 2006 
 
Panel 
A4.a  2000 
  Reading  Math  Science 
  native-
immigrant 
immigrant-
2nd gen 
native -
2nd gen 
native-
immigrant 
immigrant-
2nd gen 
native -
2nd gen 
native-
immigrant 
immigrant-
2nd gen 
native -
2nd gen 
Australia  19  -15  4  10  -9  1  17  -9  8 
Belgium  91  20  111  104  14  118  92  18  110 
Canada  27  -28  -1  14  -8  6  32  -18  14 
France  78  -37  41  82  -46  36  102  -43  59 
Germany  88  -13  75  87  -14  73  97  -13  84 
Switzer-
land 
112  -58  54  105  -46  59  107  -47  60 
UK  72  -54  18  51  -22  29  80  -62  18 
US  45  -12  33  49  -16  33  33  11  44 
 
Panel 
A4.b  2003 
  Reading  Math  Science 
  native-
immigrant 
immigrant-
2nd gen 
native -
2nd gen 
native-
immigrant 
immigrant-
2nd gen 
native -
2nd gen 
native-
immigrant 
immigrant-
2nd gen 
native -
2nd gen 
Australia  12  -8  4  2  3  5  14  -5  9 
Belgium  116  -32  84  109  -17  92  108  -19  89 
Canada  19  -28  -9  7  -13  -6  26  -18  8 
France  79  -32  47  48  24  72  88  -32  56 
Germany  86  2  88  71  22  93  85  32  117   37 
Switzer-
land 
93  -40  53  90  -31  59  102  -33  69 
UK   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --  --  
US  50  -28  22  37  -15  22  37  -4  33 
 
Panel 
A4.c  2006 
  Reading  Math  Science 
  native-
immigrant 
immigrant-
2nd gen 
native -
2nd gen 
native-
immigrant 
immigrant-
2nd gen 
native -
2nd gen 
native-
immigrant 
immigrant-
2nd gen 
native -
2nd gen 
Australia  0  -7  -7  -20  -1  -21  2  -1  1 
Belgium  102  -21  81  112  -28  84  93  -13  80 
Canada  20  -20  0  7  0  7  22  -9  13 
France  46  -10  36  62  -16  46  67  -18  49 
Germany  70  13  83  65  13  78  77  16  93 
Switzer-
land 
85  -37  48  88  -26  62  95  -26  69 
UK  44  -37  7  25  0  25  40  -14  26 
US        37  -14  23  57  -14  43 
Source:  see Table A3. 
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Appendix Table A5:  Elements of Index of Academic Achievement by Newcomers, 
PISA, 2000 - 2006 
 
Element 
High (level of 
achievement by 
newcomers): 
3 points 
Medium: 
2 points 
Low: 
1 point 
Average achievement 
score across 9 tests 
     --immigrants 
Australia 
Canada 
UK 
US 
Germany 
France 
Switzerland 
Belgium 
    -- second generation  Australia 
Canada 
UK 
France 
Switzerland  
US 
Germany  
Belgium 
Disparity between native-
born and immigrants 
Australia 
Canada 
UK 
US 
France 
Germany 
Switzerland 
Belgium 
Change in disparity 
between native-born and 
immigrants, 2000-2006 
Australia  
France  
UK 
Canada 
Switzerland 
Germany 
Belgium 
US 
 
Mobility between 
immigrants and second-
generation  
Switzerland  
UK 
France 
US 
Belgium 
Germany 
 
Australia  
Canada 
 
Change in mobility 
between immigrants and 
second-generation, 
2000-2006 
Belgium 
 
US 
 
Australia  
Canada  
France  
Germany 
Switzerland 
UK 
Educational assimilation 
between immigrants and 
second-generation 
Australia 
Canada 
US 
UK 
France 
Switzerland 
Belgium 
Germany 
Change in assimilation 
between immigrants and 
second-generation, 
2000-2006 
Belgium 
 
Australia 
France  
UK 
US 
Switzerland 
Germany 
Canada 
 
                                                 
1 Our thanks to Irene Bloemraad, Eamonn Callan, Susanna Loeb, Van Tran, and seminar 
participants at Harvard and Stanford universities for their excellent suggestions for 
improving earlier drafts.  
 
2  In a 2003 survey across thirteen western democratic countries, Canadians were most 
likely to support increased levels of immigration, and least likely to seek reduced levels.    39 
                                                                                                                                                
The disparities between Canadians and others were huge (International Social Science 
Programme various). 
 
3 “Western” is metaphorical, not geographic, since Australia is one of our cases.  
 
4 The term “regime” implies that countries are making deliberate policy choices with 
regard to, for example, the kind of immigrants they seek or permit to enter and the way in 
which they seek to educate children in that country. Of course, any policy is the outcome 
of political contingencies, and all have unintended consequences.  We assume here, 
nevertheless, that states write laws and regulations to some more or less explicit and 
recognized purpose (Allison 1969).  For a similar but more extended use of  
“immigration policy regimes,” see (Tichenor 2002). 
 
5  (Heath et al. 2008), among others, warn against combining different groups in the 
overall rubric of “immigrant.”  As they point out, distinct nationalities have different 
trajectories of schooling and employment, and different explanations best explain these 
trajectories.  We implicitly concur when we discuss migrants’ language skills and 
contextual knowledge.  Nevertheless, we believe that aggregation is warranted for some 
purposes, such as comparing states’ overall immigration regimes and overall schooling 
outcomes.  
 
6 We use the sometimes loaded term “assimilation,” simply as a synonym for 
incorporation. The process necessarily involves change in the receiving country as well 
as change in immigrants and immigrant communities, so we seek to avoid sterile debates 
over whether “assimilation” implies one-way or two-way adjustment.  
7 “Benchmarking in integration is possible, but only in a modest way… Immigrant 
populations, policy instruments, definitions and statistics are too diverse for this” 
(Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003).  Similarly, “how successfully are… newcomers being 
integrated?  This is a huge topic, on which there is little reliable comparative data” 
((Baldwin forthcoming): 97 of June 2008 version). 
 
8 This definition resembles that of (Alba and Nee 2003) and (Thomson and Crul 2007).  
In this chapter, we focus only on immigrants understood as individuals.  For groups, 
minimal incorporation would also imply host-country tolerance of the community’s 
religious and cultural commitments, some influence in the political and policy arena, 
enough of an internal class and prestige structure to permit some group members to be 
seen as leaders, and the ability to shape a community life that emerges from modes of 
living in the country of origin.    
 
9 Thanks to Nolan McCarty for this definition.  
 
10 Here too we focus on individuals and their family, not on groups.  An immigrant group 
would be better off if the community as a whole improves in its status, wealth, political 
power, or freedom of expression, even if migration does not help some members. 
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11 One could also define “better” from the perspective of the country of origin or of 
relatives and the community left behind; we save that consideration for another paper.  
 
12 We skirt the large literature on whether European, or perhaps OECD, states are 
converging in their policies on immigration and immigrant integration [e.g. (Mahnig and 
Wimmer 2000); (Peres 2008); (Schain 2008)]. Our analysis shows that national 
differences are consequential, but since we are not comparing policies over time we 
cannot say whether the differences have been narrowing. 
 
13 A useful caution: “Immigration policy is multi-dimensional and measuring it is a very 
complex undertaking given that governments can use many different tools to affect the 
number and type of immigrants entering a country. Some of these tools are relatively 
easy to measure… [b]ut others… are very hard to gauge…. [P]olicies that fall outside the 
immigration realm per se [also affect migrant flows].…  [T]he same policy might have 
drastically different consequences in terms of immigration numbers in two different 
countries,” depending on such matters as the robustness of the economy or the generosity 
of the social welfare system (Perez and Arevalo 2008): 6). 
     
14 For appropriate cautions on the reliability of these data, especially over time, see 
(Baldwin forthcoming 2009).  In his phrase, “the politics of counting foreigners is curious 
in Europe” (p. 95 of June 2008 version of ms).  (Parsons et al. 2007) provide a more 
thorough and technical discussion of the difficulties in defining an immigrant.  
 
15 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/49/24994376.pdf; 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/index.cfm 
 
16 Unlike in the post World War II era, Switzerland’s immigration policy since the 1990s 
has been based on attracting highly skilled workers. Foreign workers from EU and EFTA 
countries are granted an easy access to the Swiss labor market, regardless of their level of 
qualification; ironically, that has increased the presence of highly skilled workers. 
(www.migration-population.ch). 
 
17 This simplification is problematic in ways that affect likelihood of incorporation. 
Perhaps most importantly, since Canada and Australia have had point systems to attract 
needed skilled workers for several decades, current entrants under the family 
reunification system tend to be of higher socioeconomic status than in countries with a 
history of low-skilled guest worker programs, such as the US or Germany.  In addition, 
one analyst describes “asylum seekers to Europe … [as] a highly selected group: middle 
class professionals with enough standing at home to have gotten into political trouble 
and/or the wherewithal to make the arduous and expensive trek to the Schengen borders” 
((Baldwin forthcoming 2009): p. 99 of June 2008 version). 
   
18 In all eight states, temporary workers may bring spouse and children to the receiving 
country, so their children will be in schools, just like the children of permanent migrants.  
They are thus part of the student body whose test scores we examine in this chapter.  
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19 We also include in table 3 the average annual percent of total inflow for sending 
countries with large stocks in the receiving country, even if those are not among the five 
dominant recent senders. See, for example, the rows for India and South Africa in the 
first panel, on Australia. 
 
20 “On October 16, [1994], German voters will choose a new Parliament. The Christian 
Democratic Union and its sister Bavarian party, the Christian Social Union, have an 
election platform that acknowledges the enriching role that foreigners provide, but states 
that ‘Germany is not an immigration country’ and will not grant automatic citizenship to 
children of foreign parents born on its territory, or dual citizenship to foreigners” 
("Immigration and Germany's Elections" 1994). 
 
21 Another analysis, however, finds that France and the UK have implemented “more 
restrictive naturalization policies” since 2000, and that Belgium and Germany have 
moved in the opposite direction (Baubock et al. 2006).  More generally, citizenship laws 
are being changed frequently in many of the eight states, becoming simultaneously more 
restrictive in some ways and less so in others (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 2008c), pp. 114- XX). 
 
22 (http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx) for all but Germany; ((Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2006b): 176) for Germany. Data not available 
for the UK. 
 
23 Thus we do not report variation on the amount of school choice available to families, 
the extent and uses of evaluative testing or accountability measures, the level of 
government that makes decisions for schooling, or the number of educational programs 
offered to students.  
 
24 Some analysts resist the term “second generation immigrants” because the people to 
whom it refers are just as “native-born” as are people whose ancestors lived in the host 
country for centuries.  In principle, we agree; in practice, the phrase “second generation 
immigrants” is too convenient and too widely-used to be unilaterally jettisoned.  
 